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Abstract The interbank market is considered one of the most important channels
of contagion. Its network representation, where banks and claims/obligations are
represented by nodes and links (respectively), has received a lot of attention in the
recent theoretical and empirical literature, for assessing systemic risk and identi-
fying systematically important financial institutions. Different types of links, for
example in terms of maturity and collateralization of the claim/obligation, can be
established between financial institutions. Therefore a natural representation of the
interbank structure which takes into account more features of the market, is a multi-
plex, where each layer is associated with a type of link. In this paper we review the
empirical structure of the multiplex and the theoretical consequences of this repre-
sentation. We also investigate the betweenness and eigenvector centrality of a bank
in the network, comparing its centrality properties across different layers and with
Maximum Entropy null models.
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1 Introduction
In part as a consequence of the crisis burst after the Lehman event in late 2008,
financial networks are gaining popularity across policymakers, regulators and aca-
demics interested in systemic risk analysis. Networks are useful and natural tools
to identify critical financial institutions as well as to understand how distress could
propagate within the financial system.1 The type of financial network considered
in this paper is the one of direct exposures between financial institutions, which
include credit relations, derivatives transactions, cross-ownerships, etc..
Interlinkages between any two financial institutions is more complex than the
information that can be summarized in a single number (the weight of the link) and
a direction, such as in a directed and weighted network. This is due to the fact that
between two institutions there exists a multiplicity of linkages, each of them related
to one class of claims/obligations. The interplay between different types of relation
could be relevant for systemic risk analysis. In the network jargon, such a situation
is best modeled with a multiplex network or simply multiplex. A multiplex is made
up with several ”layers”, each of them composed by all relations of the same type
and modeled with a simple (possibly weighted and directed) network. Since the
nodes in each layer are the same, the multiplex can be visualized as a stack of
networks or equivalently by a network where several different types of links can
coexist between two nodes, each type corresponding to a layer. Figure 1 shows a
stylized representation of the interbank multiplex, where three layers are explicitly
shown, together with the aggregated interbank network.
The study of financial multiplex is still at its infancy [Montagna and Kok (2013),
Bargigli et al. (2014)]. This paper builds on the analysis performed recently by the
authors on the Italian Interbank Market (IIN) (see [Bargigli et al. (2014)]). Taking
advantage of a unique dataset collected by Banca d’Italia, [Bargigli et al. (2014)]
analyze in detail the evolution of the multiplex during the crisis (2008-2012).2
In this paper, after a brief description of the [Bargigli et al. (2014)] main findings
on the multiplex representation of the interbank market, we add on a novel result
by investigating an important network property, previously not considered, namely
the network centrality of the banks. Node centrality is critical to identify the most
important nodes in the network architecture. There are several different definitions
of centrality, depending on the meaning given to the word ”important” above. Here
1 See for instance [Abbassi et al. (2013), Allen and Gale (2000), Battiston et al. (2007),
Battiston et al. (2012), Bech and Atalay (2008), Boss et al. (2004), Caccioli et al. (2011),
Cont et al. (2011), Fricke and Lux (2013), Gai and Kapadia (2010), Iazzetta and Manna (2009),
Iori et al. (2008), Iori et al. (2006), Mastromatteo et al. (2012), Martinez Jaramillo et al. (2012),
Sorama¨ki et al. (2007)]
2 [Bargigli et al. (2014)] compare the topological proprieties of each layer, study the similarity be-
tween layers, i.e. how much one can learn from a layer knowing another one, and use a Maximum
Entropy approach to investigate which high order topological properties of each layer can be ex-
plained by the statistical properties of degree and strength. In other words, the paper investigates
how much the huge heterogeneity in degree and strength observed in interbank markets signifi-
cantly constrains (e.g. for the assortativity) or is a sufficient statistics (e.g. for the core-periphery
structure) other topological properties studied in the recent interbank network literature.
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Fig. 1: Stylized representation of the multiplex structure of the interbank market.
Each node is a bank, and links represent credit relations. A layer is the set of all
credit relations of the same type. The network in red is the total interbank market,
obtained by aggregating all the layers.
we shall consider betweenness centrality and eigenvector centrality, two widespread
centrality metrics. Our main research questions can be summarized as follows: (i)
Given a centrality measure of a node, how much is it correlated with degree and
strength of the node? Is this correlation layer specific? (ii) Is the centrality (abso-
lute or rank) of a bank approximately the same in each layer? Or are there banks
which are very central in some layers but essentially peripheral in the others? (iii)
How much the centrality of a node can be explained by a statistical null model that
preserves nodes’ degree and strength? Is the centrality ranking mostly determined
by the degree (or strength) ranking?
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the dataset and in-
troduce the construction of our multiplex. In Section 3 we review the main findings
of [Bargigli et al. (2014)] about the Italian Interbank Network. Section 4 introduces
several types of centrality metrics and presents our results, both on the investiga-
tion of the centrality property of a bank in each layer and on the comparison with
Maximum Entropy null models. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data description
Our analysis investigates a unique database of interbank transactions based on the
supervisory reports transmitted to Banca d’Italia by all institutions operating in
Italy (see [Bargigli et al. (2014)] for details). We focus only on domestic links, i.e.
transactions between Italian banks. Information refers to end-of-year outstanding
balances at the end of 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. This was a particularly
delicate period for the Italian banking system because of the concurrent sovereign
debt crisis hardly hitting the Euro zone and Italy in particular. Most banks oper-
ate in Italy through a large set of subsidiaries. Distinguishing between intragroup
and intergroup transactions is therefore crucial. Since interbank lending and bor-
rowing decisions are normally taken at the parent company level, we assume that
the relevant economic agents of the network lie at the group level. We thus focus
on data on intergroup transactions consolidated at the group level. As shown in
[Bargigli et al. (2014)] this consolidation has a dramatic effect on the volumes and
the network structure. In fact in the investigated dataset and period the intragroup
lending accounts for a fraction of the total volume ranging between 78% and 89%.
We represent the interbank market as a weighted and directed network, where
a set of nodes (banks) are linked to each other through different types of financial
instruments (edges). The direction of the link goes from the bank i having a claim
to the bank j , and the weight is the amount (in millions of Euros) of liabilities of j
towards i.
One specificity of our database is the availability of other information on the
interbank transactions, namely the maturity and the presence of a collateral. As in
[Bargigli et al. (2014)] we use this information to build a multiplex representation
of the interbank network, where each layer describes the network of a specific type
of credit relation. Specifically, in terms of maturity we consider
• Overnight (OVN) transactions
• Short term (ST) transaction, namely those with maturity up to 12 months exclud-
ing overnight
• Long term (LT) transaction, namely those with maturity of more that 12 months
Considering collateralization we distinguish
• Unsecured (U) loans, i.e. without collateral
• Secured (S) loans, i.e. with collateral
Thus, for example, the symbol U ST stands for unsecured short term contracts. We
have in total 5 possible combinations, since there are no secured overnight trans-
actions. It is important to stress that our data on secured transactions only refer to
OTC contracts, while secured transactions taking place on regulated markets and
centrally cleared are not included in our database.
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3 The multiplex structure of the Italian interbank market
In [Bargigli et al. (2014)] we presented one of the first in-depth analyses of the mul-
tiplex structure of an interbank market, investigating in particular the Italian market.
Here we summarize our main findings. The first important observation is that in-
terbank market is dominated (in volume) by intragroup lending. To give an idea,
in 2012 almost 78% of the volume of the Italian interbank market was traded be-
tween two banks belonging to the same group, while only 22% was intergroup lend-
ing. Since intergroup lending is the main channel of systemic risk propagation, in
[Bargigli et al. (2014)] and here we aggregate banks belonging to the same group
and we consider the network of banking groups.
When we consider the volume in the different layers we observed that in 2012
the layer with the largest activity was U LT with roughly 41%, followed by OVN
with 28% and U ST with 18%. The two layers describing secured transactions have
small volumes, namely 9% and 2% in the S ST and S LT , respectively. This is mostly
due to the fact that today the majority of collateralized trades are operated through
Central Counterparties (CCPs) and these trades are not included in our dataset. We
found that the three unsecured layers are composed by many nodes, while the two
secured one are much smaller. In 2012 the Italian multiplex had 533 banks, and
almost all of them were active in the three unsecured layers. In all layers there is
a strong correlation between the degree of a node (i.e. the number of counterparts)
and the its strength (the total volume lent or borrowed). The Spearman correlation
between these two quantities ranges between 0.49 and 0.94. Moreover degree and
strength are also very correlated (> 0.5) with bank size (as measured by the total
asset). This means that the size of a bank is an important determinant of the amount
traded in the interbank market and of the number of counterparts.
In [Bargigli et al. (2014)] we compared also the topology of each layer individ-
ually. All the layers display a scale free property, i.e. the degree distribution has
a power law tail characterized by a tail exponent between 1.8 and 3.5. This indi-
cates a very strong heterogeneity of the system, with few important hubs and many
low-degree nodes. Each layer has a small diameter, it is strongly reciprocal, and has
a large clustering coefficient. Finally, it presents a disassortative mixing and has a
clear core periphery structure. Below we will discuss on the relevance of these two
related last findings.
The multiplex structure of the system raises immediately the question of the sim-
ilarity between the layers, not in terms of their generic statistical properties, but on
a link-by-link basis. In other words, in [Bargigli et al. (2014)] we asked how much
the presence of a link between two banks in a layer is predictive of the presence
of a link between the same two banks in the other layers. Interestingly, the answer
is that layers are quite different one from each other, and the knowledge of the
links in one layer gives little information about the presence of links in the other
layers. On average across pairs of layers, the similarity, as measured by the Jac-
card similarity, was roughly 17% in 2012. This means that by observing a link in a
layer, one can predict that the link exists in another layer only in 17% of the cases.
This low level of similarity, combined with the high level of similarity between the
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same layer in consecutive years (roughly 70%), indicates that banks diversify their
counterparts across different layers, but maintain stable relationships with the same
counterparts in a given layer across the years. From a systemic risk point of view,
the dissimilarity between layers tells us that the propagation of contagion can be
significantly faster when one considers the multiplex structure, as compared with
the contagion in individual layers. In fact, simple diffusion models on multiplex
networks [Gomez et al. (2013)] show that diffusion can be very fast when the layers
are ”orthogonal” one to each other. In the second part of this paper we will consider
a related question, namely how much centrality measures of a node are specific of a
layer or whether different nodes are the most central in different layers.
Finally, [Bargigli et al. (2014)] compares the properties of the real multiplex net-
work with those obtained under statistical null models, specifically with Maximum
Entropy models (see Section 4.2 below). The Maximum Entropy principle allows
to build explicitly probability distributions of graphs, which are maximally random
and satisfy some given constraints. In particular we constrained the ensembles to
have, on average, the same degree and/or strength sequence as the real network. This
choice corresponds to the (weighted) configuration model. The aim of this analysis
is to discriminate which high order properties of the real interbank networks are
a mere consequence of the heterogeneity of degrees (or strengths) and which are
instead genuinely new properties. We focused on disassortativity, reciprocity, and
the presence of triadic motifs and we discussed which of these properties can be
reproduced by the null model. To give a specific, yet important, example of the
application of Maximum Entropy null models to interbank networks, we discuss
briefly the case of the core-periphery structure.
Recently there has been an increasing interest toward the core-periphery struc-
ture of the interbank network [Craig and von Peter (2009), Fricke and Lux (2012)].
The core is defined as a subset of nodes which are maximally connected with
other core members, while the periphery is the complementary subset made of
nodes with no reciprocal connections but having only connections with the core
[Borgatti and Everett (2000)]. Recently, [Craig and von Peter (2009)] defined a tier-
ing model in which core members without links with the periphery are penalized.
Despite the fact that the two definitions of core-periphery are different, because of
the different objective function, in Appendix 2 of [Bargigli et al. (2014)] we found
that the two models are highly correlated, i.e. the identified cores are essentially
the same. The key question now is whether core-periphery is a genuine property of
the interbank network or if it can be explained by the strong heterogeneity of de-
gree. To this end in [Bargigli et al. (2014)] we generated random sample from the
Maximum Entropy ensemble where we fix either the average degree or the average
weight of each node. By comparing the core-periphery subdivision in the real net-
work or in the random samples, we conclude that they are very similar one to each
other3. Thus core-periphery subdivision (at least by using the aforementioned defi-
nitions) is a consequence of the large heterogeneity of degree. Since, as mentioned
3 It is worth noticing that this can also be explained by using the result of [Lip (2011)],
showing analytically that the subdivision in core and periphery according to the definition of
[Borgatti and Everett (2000)] is entirely determined by the degree sequence.
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above, degree and bank size are strongly correlated, we conclude that in great part
core-periphery structure is a consequence of the existence of large and small banks.
4 Centrality measures
Centrality is a key concept of network theory, originally developed in social net-
work analysis and rapidly developed to other types of networks. Broadly speaking,
the centrality of a node (or of an edge) of a network is a measure of the importance
of the node, measuring, for example, how influential is a person in a social network,
how critical is an element in an infrastructure network, what is the disease spreading
capacity of an individual, etc.. Despite being an important concept, the loose defi-
nition given above leads to several different proposed centrality measures, each of
them able to capture some specific aspects of the concept of centrality. The review
of all the centrality measures is beyond the scope of this paper. In the following we
will discuss the three measures of node centrality we are going to use in the analysis
of the different layers of the IIN.
Degree centrality. Degree of a node is an obvious measure of centrality. A large
number of links, in fact, is a symptom of the fact that the node is important for the
connection of all the nodes which are linked to it. It is a local measure, i.e. it does
not take into account the whole network, but only the local neighborhood of the
node. Thus, while for small networks degree is a sensible centrality measure, for
large networks it can miss important global characteristics of the importance of the
node.
Betweenness centrality. One of the most popular global centrality measures is
the betweenness centrality (often shortened as betweenness in the following). It
quantifies how frequently a node acts as a bridge along the shortest path between
two other nodes. More formally, betweenness centrality of a node v is computed in
the following way: for each pair of vertices (i, j) one identifies the Ni j shortest paths
between them and computes the number Ni j(v) of them that pass through v. The
betweenness of node v is
CB(v) =
1
(n−1)(n−2) ∑i, j 6=v
Ni j(v)
Ni j
, (1)
i.e. the average fraction of shortest paths passing through v, where the average is
taken across all the pairs of vertices. The number of nodes in the network is n and the
normalization factor in equation 1, and used in this paper, holds for directed graphs.
IntuitivelyCB(v) measures how frequently a shortest path between two nodes passes
through a given node.
Eigenvector centrality. Eigenvector centrality is defined in terms of the adja-
cency matrix A= {ai j}, where ai j can be either a binary or a non negative real value
(weighted matrix). The vector x= (x1, ....,xn)′, containing the eigenvector centrality
xi of node i, satisfies
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Fig. 2: Complementary cumulative distribution function of betweenness in the unse-
cured overnight layer (left panel) and in the unsecured long term layer (right panel)
in 2012. The plot is in double logarithmic scale and the green line is the best fit with
a power law function. The tail exponent α is reported in the panels.
Ax= λmaxx (2)
i.e. it is a right eigenvector of the adjacency matrix corresponding to the maximal
eigenvalue λmax. Interpreting the network as a representation of a Markov chain with
n states and transition probabilities proportional to the weights of the links connect-
ing two nodes (states), it can be seen that the vector x is the stationary probability
distribution of the chain. Interestingly the eigenvector centrality is at the heart of
Google’s PageRank algorithm. In the context of systemic risk, it has been recently
modified to define DebtRank [Battiston et al. (2012)] for measuring the centrality
of the network of mutual exposures and BankRank [Dehmamy et al. (2014)] for
measuring the centrality of the bipartite network of banks and assets. In the present
paper we will use the original definition of eigenvector centrality of Eq. 2.
4.1 Centrality measures in the interbank multiplex
The aim of this subsection is to compare the centrality measures in different layers
of the interbank network. The comparison of the degree of a bank in different layers
has been investigated in depth in [Bargigli et al. (2014)], also with respect to null
models that preserve the degree in average (configuration model). For this reason in
the paper we will consider mostly betweenness and eigenvector centrality.
As a preliminary analysis, figure 2 shows the distribution of betweenness in two
important layers, overnight and unsecured medium term in 2012 (similar results are
obtained for the other investigated years). The distribution is well fit by a power law
function with a tail exponent between 1.5 and 2. This fat tail behavior shows that
there is a large heterogeneity of the betweenness centrality among the banks in all
layers. In part this heterogeneity in the value of the betweenness is due to the scale
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Fig. 3: Scatter plot of the betweenness and different nodes properties, namely out-
degree (a), in-degree (b), out-strength (c), and in-strength (d). Each point is a bank
group. The values of ρ and ρs are the Pearson and the Spearman correlation, respec-
tively. Data refer to the unsecured overnight layer in 2012.
free behavior of the layers. In fact, as shown in [Bargigli et al. (2014)], the degree
distribution of each layer is well fit by a power law tail and the estimated values
of the tail exponent are remarkably stable across layers and over time, ranging in
[1.8,3.5] and mostly concentrated around 2.3.
The relation between degree and betweenness of the banks in the overnight of the
Italian Interbank Networks is shown in Fig. 3 (top panels), while the bottom panels
show the relation between strength and betweenness. To have a numerical value to
quantify the dependence between the two variables, in each figure we report both
the value of the Pearson correlation and the value of the Spearman rank correlation.
It is worth noticing that in general the former is significantly larger than the latter.
This is due to the strong correlation in the right tail of the two variables (i.e. for large
and very connected banks). The top panels show that banks with large in- (or out-)
degree are also the nodes with high betweenness centrality. The same holds when
one considers the in- or out-strength (bottom panels), even if in this case this strong
relation is evident only for a smaller interval of large values of strength.
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This analysis shows that large (and/or more interconnected) banks are also typ-
ically those more central (as measured by the betweenness)4. Thus, at least in the
Italian Interbank Market, it is hard to discriminate between too big to fail and too
interconnected to fail. Considering medium and small sized banks, the relation be-
tween centrality and degree and especially size becomes significantly noisier, and
by looking at figure 3, it is possible to identify banks with moderate strength but
significant centrality. These institutions are likely playing a central role in interme-
diation in the considered layer or connecting subsets of banks which are only weakly
connected.
We then investigate whether banks which are central in a given layer are also
central in other layers. This is important because it gives insight on the degree of
specialization of some banks as intermediary for some type of credit. To answer this
question we compute centrality measure in different layers and compare the values
(or the ranking) We remind that the number of banks active in the different layers
is different [Bargigli et al. (2014)]. For example, in 2012, of the 533 banks active
in the interbank market, 532 had credit relations in the overnight market, 521 were
active in the unsecured short term, 450 in the unsecured long term, and 45 in the
secured short term. In order to compare layers with different number of nodes, we
computed the centrality measures in the whole layer (i.e. including all the banks
active in the layer), but we compared the centrality measures only within the subset
of banks which were active in both layers. Therefore, when considering rankings,
it should be kept in mind that these are not absolute rankings, but only rankings
among the banks considered in the intersection.
Figure 4 shows the scatter plot of the betweenness in the overnight market ei-
ther versus the betweenness in the unsecured long term (left panel) or versus the
betweenness in the unsecured long term (right panel) market. In the figure we also
report the value of the Pearson and Spearman correlation and, as explained above,
the former is typically much higher of the latter due to the high correlation on the
top left part of the scatter plot.
Comparing the short term and overnight layers (left panel), it is evident that top
central nodes in one layer are also typically central in the other layer. For medium
and low centrality, the correlation is much weaker. On the contrary, the right panel
shows that, with the exception of three banks on the top right corner of the figure,
there is a very weak correlation between the centrality in the overnight network and
in the long term network. This is an indication that in some cases, centrality of a
bank, also with respect to the other banks, can be markedly different in different
layers. Therefore central banks in the long term layer are not necessarily central in
the overnight or in the short term layer.
Similar conclusions can be drawn by considering the eigenvector centrality. Fig-
ure 5 shows the scatter plot between the eigenvector centrality and in- and out-
degree (top panels) and in- and out-strength (bottom panels). The correlation are
significantly smaller when compared to those of the betweenness centrality (see Fig.
4 As mentioned in Section 3, [Bargigli et al. (2014)] show that nodes’ properties (degree and
strength) turn out to be correlated with balance sheet data of banks, in particular with the total
assets.
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Fig. 4: Scatter plot of the betweenness in the unsecured overnight versus that in the
unsecured short term layer. The year investigated is 2012. The values of ρ and ρs
are the Pearson and the Spearman correlation, respectively.
3). In this sense eigenvector centrality (and probably DebtRank) brings information
on the importance of a bank which is not contained already in the basic measures of
degree and strength.
Finally, in figure 6 we show the three dimensional plots of the eigenvector cen-
trality in the three unsecured layers, namely overnight, short term, and long term.
We show the results for the four years because we find a different behavior in the
different years. In all years we find a very large dispersion of points, indicating that
the eigenvector centrality in the three considered layers is very different. Thus the
importance of a node, as measured by the eigenvector centrality, is typically quite
layer specific.
4.2 Comparison with null models
As a last analysis, we compare our findings on the centrality metrics with suitable
statistical null models. In the last two decades complex network theory has intro-
duced a large number of metrics able to capture many interesting aspects of the
organization of networks, such as clustering, assortativity, core-periphery structure,
etc. However, from a statistical point of view, it is not always clear which of these
properties carry some information which is not already contained, in some form,
in simpler properties of the network. For example, one could ask whether the core-
periphery organization observed in many networks (included the interbank ones) is
not a mere consequence of the large heterogeneity in degree of the considered net-
work. In fact, in a network with heterogeneous degree distribution, a core periphery
emerges even if the links among nodes are assigned randomly.
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Fig. 5: Scatter plot of the eigenvector centrality and different nodes properties,
namely out-degree (a), in-degree (b), out-strength (c), and in-strength (d). Each
point is a bank group. The values of ρ and ρs are the Pearson and the Spearman
correlation, respectively. Data refer to the unsecured overnight layer in 2012.
To properly answer to these questions one needs to build statistical models of
networks, which allow computing a probability distribution of graphs. Such a dis-
tribution is calibrated on the investigated real network, and it is chosen in such a
way to preserve some low order properties (e.g. the degree of each node). Then one
computes, analytically or computationally, the distribution of the considered high
order property (e.g. the size of the core) and extracts from it a p-value for the value
observed in the real data.
One of the most common methods for building null models is by using the Maxi-
mum Entropy Principle.5 One looks for the probability distribution for graphs, P(G),
which maximizes the Shannon entropy
5 See for instance [Bargigli (2013), Bargigli and Gallegati (2011), Fagiolo et al. (2013),
van Lelyveld and In ’t Veld (2012), Mistrulli (2011), Park and Newman (2004),
Squartini and Garlaschelli (2011)].
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Fig. 6: Three dimensional scatter plot of the decimal logarithm of the eigenvector
centrality in the three unsecured layers in the period 2009-2012.
S[P(G)] =−∑
G
P(G) lnP(G) (3)
under suitable constraints, including the normalization ∑GP(G) = 1. More details
on the construction and estimation of Maximum Entropy models for networks are
reviewed in Appendix 4 of [Bargigli et al. (2014)].
Here we consider the so called Directed Binary Configuration Model (DBCM)
(see [Bargigli et al. (2014)]). In this case we impose 2n constraints, namely the av-
erage in- and out-degree of each node. This model can be fitted from a real network
using Maximum Likelihood and one can then sample from a graph distribution of
a DBCM calibrated on the a real network. We can compute the distribution of the
betweenness centrality for each node of the network under the DBCM. We then
compute the p-value of the betweenness centrality of each node observed in the real
network.
Figure 7 shows the scatter plot of the betweenness centrality in the real network
versus the one simulated in the DBCM. As a first observation we note that there
is a significantly high Pearson and Spearman correlation between the betweenness
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Fig. 7: Scatter plot of the betweenness centrality in the real network and in the one
simulated from the Maximum Entropy (ME) ensemble corresponding to the directed
configuration model. Larger circles correspond to nodes for which the (ME) null
model is rejected with 1% confidence. The values of ρ and ρs are the Pearson and
the Spearman correlation, respectively. Data refer to 2012.
in the real and simulated network. In this sense we can conclude that a significant
fraction of the betweenness centrality property of a node is a consequence of the
degree distribution. This observation is in agreement with the empirical observation
described above that betweenness centrality is very correlated with degree. However
deviations from the null model can be identified by computing for each node the
p−value, comparing the centrality in the real network with the values obtained by a
large sample of network realization. In figure 7 larger circles correspond to nodes for
which the (ME) null model is rejected with 1% confidence. Interestingly, the nodes
for which betweenness centrality is larger than what expected from their degree (and
the Maximum Entropy null model) are mostly large banks.
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5 Conclusions
This paper reviews the multiplex description of the interbank market proposed in
[Bargigli et al. (2014)]. In this description, each layer is a network of interbank ex-
posures characterized by the maturity and the presence of a collateral. By using an
unique dataset of the Italian Interbank market, we discuss the main findings related
to (i) the similarity of the topological properties of the different layers, (ii) the link-
by-link similarity of pairs of layers and (iii) the use of Maximum Entropy approach
for the construction of layer-specific null models.
The main original contribution of the paper is the investigation of two centrality
measures, namely betweenness and eigenvector centrality, in the multiplex describ-
ing the Italian Interbank market. We found that the correlation between the centrality
of a bank in different layer is significant, but not extremely large. There are several
medium sized banks which are central in some layers and peripheral in others. Very
large banks are typically central in all layers, but this can be due - at least partially
- to the constraint given by their typically large degree. Interestingly, the centrality
of large banks is not explained by Maximum Entropy null models preserving the
degree of each node. This indicates deviations from centrality measure expected by
the degree distribution. Finally, betweenness centrality is more correlated with de-
gree than eigenvector centrality. This finding seems to indicate that the eigenvector
centrality is less affected by information already contained in the degree, strength,
and bank size.
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